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THE INSPIRATION AND 
COUNTER-INSPIRATION OF 
ASTRONOMICAL PHENOMENA 
STANLEY L. }AKI 
Astronomical phenomena are in a sense mere celestial phenomena, but actually 
much more. Suffice it to think of the enormous conceptual surplus which is seen in 
such ordinary celestial phenomena as comets, eclipses, and planetary conjunctions 
whenever they are seen through the eyes of astronomy and not merely with the 
naked eye, strengthened as this eye may be by geometry. The surplus in question 
should seem even more obvious in reference to such extraordinary celestial phe-
nomena as supernovae. Whatever the relative unimportance of their motion 
through space, their mostly spectroscopic study too rests on the full formulation, 
since the times of Newton, of the three laws of motion.' It is on the application, 
immediate or remote, of those laws that all physical science, including astronomy, 
rests. 
This distinction between mere celestial phenomena and astronomical phenome-
na bears also on the inspiration which they respectively produce. Let us take the 
respective reactions to the same kind of phenomena, supernovae, between I 054 
and 1987. In fune I 054 Chinese stargazers spotted a novel bright spot in the sky 
which, not surprisingly, they took for a guest star (hho hsing), the Chinese name for 
comets. The fact that it did not infringe on Aldebaran inspired in them the view that 
the rule of the emperor would be beneficial.' Such an inspiration belongs in the class 
of vain hopes and unnecessary fears triggered by comets and other celestial phe-
nomena listed above. The prospect of removing such fears from the human mind 
was, in fact, a chief benefit which Halley celebrated in the ode he prefixed to 
Newton's Principia. 3 Inspiring as this prospect could be, it remained for long but a 
prospect and not a result to be shared broadly. 
Considerable improvement in correlating positions, either through naked-eye obser-
vations and/ or more refined geometrical methods, did not raise inspiration to a level 
Stanley L faki, a Hungarian-born Benedictine priest, is Distinguished University Professor at Seton Hall 
University. Winner of the Templeton Prize for 1987, he is an honorary member of the Pontifical 
Academy of Sciences. 
THE ASBURY THEOLOGICALjOURNAL 
FALL 1996 v 0 l 5 1 N 0 . 2 
72 jaki 
much higher than the class described above. This is amply revealed in the reaction of T ycho 
Brahe, the most accurate observer of the sky prior to the advent of telescopes, to the second 
spotting in recorded history, of a supernova. Not knowing anything of what those Chinese 
stargazers had seen in 1054, Tycho Brahe telt that he had made a truly historic first when, 
on the evening of November I I, 1572, he noticed a very bright star in Cassiopeiea. This 
novelty was in fact the very first item Tycho Brahe mentioned in the long-winded title of his 
De nova et nul/ius aevi memoria ptius visa ste/la ... , a book of I 04 small quarto pages which he 
published in short order, excited as he was by what he had seen.' 
As far as inspiration was concerned, the title of Tycho Brahe's book could seem 
promising on a superficial look. The new phenomenon, he stated, inspired him to engage 
in "mathematical contemplation." Of course, the contemplation had nothing to do with 
the kind of contemplation of which mystics are the best authority. Tycho Brahe's mental 
eyes were fixed on the astrological art of predicting the weather from the planets' posi-
tions. He felt that once those positions were related to the new star's position the credibili-
ty of that art would be greatly strengthened. In other words, Tycho Brahe's inspiration 
was an increased sense of job-security. Whatever the genuineness of such an inspiration, it 
certainly has a strong touch of modernity. T ycho Brahe was not, however, so modem as 
to see in the new star a refutation of the Aristotelo-Ptolemaic doctrine of the incorruptibil-
ity of the heavens. 
Historians of science would look in vain for traces of some rationalist or iconoclastic 
modernity in the elegy with which Tycho Brahe introduced his booklet on the new star. 
The elegy betrays the kind of inspiration which would best be called lucubration. Indeed, 
this was the very word which T ycho Brahe, at the last moment, did not let grace, or 
rather disgrace, the title page of his hardly inspiring booklet. 
Much more modern, and certainly far deeper, was the inspiration which Kepler 
derived from his observations of the nova of 1604. Excited he certainly was. Otherwise 
he would not have dashed off a book De stella nova in petie Serpentatii. But his excitement 
was that of a deep-seated concern. The new star could easily be taken for a disproof of 
the stanry sphere and for a proof of the presumed truth of the idea that the universe was 
an indefinite, infinite agglomerate of stars. By 1604 Giordano Bruno had already created 
some excitement with his strange inspirations about infinite worlds, all forever changing 
into one another, with no basic difference between stars and planets. Kepler sensed that 
had Bruno not been burned at the stake in Rome in 1600 (a fate Bruno had escaped 
twenty or so years earlier in Geneva where he was forced to abjure his doctrines), he 
would have seized on the nova of 1604 as a licence for a reckless wandering across infi-
nite spaces. To nip in the bud this kind of use of astronomy and its phenomena, Kepler 
felt that "astronomy was to be forced to return to its very confines. For certainly nothing 
good was to be gained by vagabonding through that infinity."5 
Unlike Kepler, many modem astronomers love that vagabonding' Often they register, 
with no trace of agonies, their view that the better the universe is known, the more purpose-
less it appears.' However, they fully share Kepler's excitement about the heuristic value of 
precise measurements. There is something mystical in Kepler's singing the praises of T ycho' s 
measurements as the key to the breakthroughs which later became known as Kepler s three 
laws and greatly helped Newton to make modem scientific astronomy possible . 
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Precise measurements were in fact the basic reason for the variety of inspirations which 
suddenly filled astronomers in late February 1987. On February 24, to be exact, their instru-
ments alerted them to the flare-up, in the southern hemisphere, of a supernova. Apart from 
the excitement felt over the novelty, the first data inspired them at least in the sense that 
they would not soon run out of research problems. The sense of job-security is not some-
thing to be taken lightly even when it is accompanied by the sobering realization that long-
standing theories about the origin of supernovae woukl have to be drastically revised. 
Before long this somber mood yielded to a sort of exultation. By June specialists in 
supernova structure and evolution felt confident that the data dramatically strengthened 
their theories, worked out over several decades. A reason for this was, as The New York 
Times reported, that already in early March "astronomers and technical experts, usually 
jealous of their findings, were pooling their observations" as they tried "to solve the super-
nova's many mysteries."8 An inspiration certainly commends itself when it helps eliminate 
selfishness and promotes co-operation. Before long, still another kind of inspiration made 
itself felt as leading astronomers took the view that the data pouring in would shed much 
light on the ultimate fate of the universe.9 
The history of modem astronomy shows many other cases about these two kinds of 
elation felt over a new astronomical phenomenon, or discovery. One such elation is felt 
over the fact that the astronomical phenomenon provides the seal of truth on a theory. 
The other form of such elation is related to the fact that the astronomical phenomenon 
opens vistas of further work which may carry the theorist far beyond the range of what 
has already been worked out. Take, for instance, the discovery by Leverrier, in 1845, of 
Neptune, a planet postulated by periodic disturbances in the orbit of Uranus. A stunning 
proof of the truth of Newtonian celestial dynamics, the discovery of a new planet pro-
duced so great an elation as to make Auguste Comte decry it as insane. But there was 
nothing insane in the heroic work of W. C. Tombaugh, which ultimately led to the dis-
covery of Pluto.'° 
Comte had an ax to grind. Nothing was more dangerous for his positivism than any-
thing really novel in science, especially in astronomy. 11 He did not live to hear the voice of 
jubilation that greeted Higgins' observation of traces of helium in the spectral lines of the 
sun. Here too an astronomical phenomenon provided an inspiring capstone on a work 
already under way, a work initiated by Fraunhofer. Higgins' work also spurred the regis-
tering. in vast numbers, of spectral lines. The theoretical co-ordination of those spectral 
lines began with Bohr's model of the hydrogen atom. When first told about it, Einstein 
was inspired to state: "But this is then the greatest of all discoveries."" 
A capstone on the truth of theories about a very early hot state of the universe was 
provided by the discovery of the 2. 7'K cosmic background radiation in 1965. The excite-
ment went hand in hand with the inspiration to do further and extensive study, theoreti-
cal as well as experimental, on that radiation. But the inspiration had other aspects as well. 
Such a hot early state could not be reconciled with the steady state theory. While this and 
other consequences of that radiation exhilarated the proponents of what by then had 
been known as the Big Bang, it inspired the grim resolve of the champions of the steady 
state theory to keep working out alternatives to an apparent cosmic beginning. 
Champions of the steady state theory disclosed only now and then that their opposi-
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tion to the Big Bang was motivated by a counter-theological inspiration. The rank materi-
alism of most champions of the steady-state theory dictated that the Universe was the ulti-
mate entity and as such it had to be without a beginning. Unfortunately, only on rare 
occasions was that materialistic inspiration exposed by prominent astronomers. One of 
these was Amo Penzias, co-discoverer of that radiation." He was, however, hardly right 
in buttressing the opposite kind of inspiration with his claim about Genesis I. In the 
phrase of Genesis I, "Let there be light'" Penzias saw an anticipation of the 2.7°K cosmic 
background radiation. 14 This was a most unfortunate echo of that blind inspiration which 
animates those who nowadays refer to themselves as creationists, that is, those who take 
Genesis I for a science textbook. 
Counter-theological, or strictly materialistic, inspiration is not absent either in the effort 
to find the so-called missing matter. In it.1elf the effort is purely scientific. Clearly, not 
enough matter is known to exist if the rotational dynamics of galaxies obeys Kepler's third 
law. But one wonders whether non-scientific inspiration is not strongly at work in sustain-
ing the search for the missing matter. 15 A successful outcome of that search would be 
taken by not a few as a proof of an eternal cosmic dynamics. Had not such motivations 
been at work, less despondency would have greeted the news that the very first experi-
ments completed with the Keck Telescope in Hawaii, the largest telescope in the world, 
yielded evidence about a surprisingly large abundance of deuterium in the distant, and 
therefore early, universe. This was inspiring news for advocates of the Big Bang, but vel)' 
bad news for those searching for the missing matter, let alone for rearguard advocates of 
the steady-state theory. 
For both camps there remained, of course, the excitement or inspiration, about the 
prospect of vastly improved observational possibilities. This is what John N. Bahcall 
seemed to have emphasized in saying that the result in question had astronomers "danc-
ing in the dark corridors of their observatories." The new telescope was so great a success, 
he continued, that "some of the questions that astronomers have sought to answer for 
decades may be solved in a night's observations with these new eyes.016 
It is not, however, easy to keep from view the religiously colored inspiration in refer-
ence to even the latest astronomical phenomena. A case in point is George Smoot' s 
announcement of slight variations in the 2.7°K cosmic background radiation. The news 
produced an outburst of reactions, many of them inspirational in a religious sense. Smoot 
himself first took the view that, to quote his very words, "if you are religious, it's like look-
ing at God." A week or so later, being reminded of this, Smoot tried to balance that reli-
gious inspiration with a distinctly secularist one: "What matters is the science; l want to 
leave the religious implications to theologians and to each person, and let them see how 
the findings fit into their idea of the universe."" 
Underlying this balancing act is the fact that one and the same astronomical phenome-
non can generate inspired states of mind which, differ as they may from one another, 
subjectively can be designated by the same word, inspiration. This can happen even when 
the same religious sentiments are intensely shared. While John Donne was downcast by 
the apparent vanishing of all coherence because of the rise of heliocentrism and atomism; 
both were taken by Pierre Gassendi, also in holy orders, for harbingers of good news. 
More wisely, Pascal, greater than those two as a philosopher, as a scientist, and as a 
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Christian, argued that science is absolutely impotent to deliver even a drop of that 
supreme inspiration which is genuine selfless love. 18 
Of course, when religious sentiments, let alone the same religious sentiments, are not 
shared, it is almost inevitable that the same astronomical phenomenon will produce wide-
ly different inspirations. One such difference became a legendary page in the history of 
astronomy. To the question of Napoleon, who found no reference to God in Laplace's 
Systeme du monde, Laplace answered that he did not need that hypothesis. While this was 
a most defensible position, Laplace conveyed something of the practical atheism which 
animated him in those years. Indeed, countless writers and speakers took his words for a 
proof that atheism or agnosticism is the inspiration appropriate to the science of astrono-
my. It is rarely mentioned that when Laplace uttered those memorable words, Herschel 
was present and politely disagreed.' 9 
There was no such confrontation between the Abbe Lemaitre and Robert Millikan as 
they served on the panel which the British Association sponsored in 193 I on the latest in 
cosmology, the expansion of the universe and, by implication, its origin. This is not to sug-
gest that the confrontation was not a distinct possibility and all the more so as both 
Lemaitre and Millikan distinguished themselves with work on cosmic rays and both saw 
the question of the origin of cosmic rays as relevant to the question of the origin of the 
universe. Far from agreeing with the suggestion that perhaps "an infallible oracle" might 
provide the answer, Lemaitre preferred the oracle's silence so that "a subsequent genera-
tion would not be deprived of the pleasure of searching for and finding the solution."'° 
Millikan, however, suggested that if theories proved that annihilation processes went on in 
interstellar spaces and not only within the stars themselves, this would "obviously influ-
ence strongly not only present theories but also all future theories of the origin and des-
tiny of the universe."" What Millikan expected was nothing less than a scientific proof of 
the view, hardly verifiable scientifically, that matter is eternal. Unlike Lemaitre, who kept 
his philosophico-religious inspiration apart from doing science, Millikan readily grafted on 
science a counter-religious inspiration. 
While Millikan, and like-minded scientists in the West, had the freedom not to do so, 
scientists in the Soviet Union were forced to mix their scientific inspiration with a materi-
alistic counter-inspiration imposed on them. I was the personal witness of one such case, 
the last-minute appearance of Y. A. Ambartsumian as member of the cosmology panel at 
the 17th World Congress of Philosophy in Diisseldorf in 1978. There, in order to reward 
the Party for the opportunity to go abroad, he suddenly departed from his topic dealing 
with stellar evolution. He did so in order to declare in a phrase or two that no scientific 
conclusion had better empirical foundation than the doctrine of dialectical materialism 
about the eternity of matter. 22 
But even when non-scientific sources of inspiration are kept out of focus, the inspira-
tion sparked or sustained by work on much the same astronomical phenomena can 
reveal differences worth noting and all the more so because they clearly point beyond 
what is strictly scientific. Edwin Hubble concluded his classic 1he Realm of the Nebulae in 
words in which grim resolve to continue the exploration of space is coupled with scorn 
for theoretical reflections. What made Hubble scorn theories was not, however, his love 
for experimental work, but his infatuation with empiricism. At the dim boundary, or the 
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utmost limit of our telescopes, Hubble wrote, "we measure shadows, and we search 
among ghostly errors of measurements for landmarks that are scarcely more substantial. 
The search will continue. Not until the empirical resources are exhausted, need we pass 
on to the dreamy realms of speculation."" A philosophically very different end-note was 
struck by Richard C. Tolman in his equally classic Relativity, Thermodynamics and 
Cosmology: "It is appropriate to approach the problems of cosmology with feelings of 
respect for their importance, of awe for their vastness, and of exultation for the temerity 
of the human mind in attempting to solve them. They must be treated, however, by the 
detailed, critical, and dispassionate methods of the scientist.''" 
The contrast between these two grand conclusions should seem all the greater as both 
were first published about the same time, the mid- I 930s. The second came from a leader 
in a highly theoretical relativistic cosmology who clearly relished the inspirational power 
of theorizing. The first came from one so disdainful of theories as to fail to acknowledge 
that all empirical observations are theory-laden and, indeed, to so great an extent as to 
beckon to domains open only to eyes which are inspired by much more than mere sci-
ence. To treat with empiricist contempt such domains is no less mistaken even from the 
purely astronomical viewpoint than to wade into its vast reaches with the presumption 
that scientific skill is enough to do philosophy and theology even moderately well. 
One need, however, be on guard against believing that the consideration of the history 
of astronomy may readily impose a fair measure of sobriety on students of the realm of 
the stars, nebulae, and, indeed, of the astronomical universe as such. And what if sobriety 
begins to parade in the garrnents of that subtle dizziness which is known as solipsism? 
Two highly regarded surveys of the history of twentieth-century cosmological theories 
fully illustrate this fearful outcome. For whatever the markedly pragmatico-idealistic 
philosophies of their respective authors, the theories surveyed by them provide ample 
material for supporting their doubts about the reality of the astronomical universe. They, 
however, failed to see that by taking the latent or unabashed solipsism of many a cosmol-
ogist and astronomer for science they not only did rank injustice to the cosmos or uni-
verse but also cast doubt on the merit of the very titles of their books. For if one could 
not have rational assurance in the reality of the totality of things which is the universe, 
there is clearly no such a thing as "the measure of the universe."21 On the same supposi-
tion cosmic reality can but degenerate into "an invented universe" impossible to invent for 
the purposes of any science which cannot take its instruments for mere inventions.26 
The author of The Invented Universe found that all modem cosmology tends to substan-
tiate W. De Sitter's prediction that the universe is but a hypothesis which "may at some 
future stage of the development of science have to be given up, or modified, or at least 
differently interpreted."" This dispiriting prophecy can be seen to come true in that inco-
herent statistical ensemble into which the coherent totality of things, or Universe, is turned 
in quantum cosmological theories. Their proponents are signally oblivious to the fact that 
conviction about the rational coherence of all things, however distant from one another, 
has from the start been the great inspiration which propelled science, including astrono-
my. The inspirational lifeblood of astronomy depends indeed on giving a firrnly affirrna-
tive answer to the question, Is There a Universe?,28 taken that universe for the strict totality 
of consistently interacting material entities. 
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These details, old and new, from the history of astronomy put one face to face with a 
wide variety of meanings which the word inspiration may carry. Therefore it may pay 
well to take a close look at the word itself. Otherwise this conference" too may suffer the 
fate typical of almost all of them. All symposia, so goes a slightly sarcastic remark, begin in 
confusion and end in confusion, though on a much higher level. Those who have already 
sat through a dozen or so symposia would hardly disagree with this far-from-flattering 
generalization If one looks for the reason, one may find it in the failure of the organizers 
to call for a clear definition of basic terms. Or one may find it in the speakers' unwilling-
ness to come clean. In modem academia, haziness, couched in convoluted language, has 
come to be taken for profundity. 
Will that haziness be dissipated by consulting the 18-volume Oxford English Dictionary? 
On a first look, the effort may seem promising. The word inspiration, together with its 
verb form, to inspire, takes up five columns, or ten times the mere half a column which is 
the average space allotted to the 400,000 words listed in the 8,000 quarto pages of that 
truly magnum opus. 
Should one therefore expect that the hundred or so uses of the word inspiration listed 
there would stand for a great variety of meanings? Far from it. All those meanings fall into 
three distinct groups, of which one, the physical act of breathing, or to breathe air into 
something, may be conveniently ignored for our purposes, unless boredom or the sum-
mer heat calls for in-spiration, that is, artificial respiration, or mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. 
Another meaning of the word inspiration is related to God who supernaturally inspires 
some thoughts or courses of action. This essentially theological meaning may also be 
ignored, at least for the moment. Of immediate interest is the third, or essentially figura-
tive meaning. All the varieties of that meaning, filling most of those five columns, hinge on 
the last word of its definition: Inspiration is "a breathing in or infusion of some idea, pur-
pose etc. into the mind; the suggestion, awakening, or creation of some feeling or 
impulse, esp. of an exalted kind."'° 
Inspiration is then connected, as was already surmised in the beginning of this paper, 
with a state of exaltation. Unfortunately, about that state the same vast dictionary does 
not offer the kind of enlightenment which is clarity. We are told that one is having an 
exalted thought when, figuratively speaking, one takes some higher ground or perspec-
tive. Herein lies hidden a sort of tautology, something even worse than a mere paradox. 
Taking a higher ground means exaltation which in tum is the principal ingredient of inspi-
ration. Conversely, once one is inspired, one is exalted and therefore on a higher ground. 
One may indeed ask: When using the words excitement and inspiration are we not run-
ning in a circle? Is not the luxury of having two or three different words at our disposal a 
mere cover-up for intellectual poverty when those three inspiration, 
and higher ground-define one another? 
This hardly enviable situation is made worse by the fact that in reference to the state of 
excitement the dictionary makes no mention of the fact that in such a state one is usually 
animated with a strong sense of purpose, or at least by an illusion of it In view of this 
connection, one is entitled to say that an absence of sense of purpose, a sense of being 
would be on hand whenever excitement would yield to its opposite, namely, deject-
edness or despondency. Therefore one could just as well coin a new word, counter-inspi-
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ration, a word not listed in that huge dictionary, although it lists many composite words 
that begin with "counter-" and, assuming their meaning to be obvious, does not give their 
definition. Counter-inspiration would then mean to feel not only very low or dejected, 
but also to feel deprived of a constructive or abiding sense of purpose, or even more pic-
turesquely, to feel one's self to be mere flotsam and jetsam on unfathomable cosmic 
waters. More of this shortly. 
But first the so-called higher ground. It is a treacherous ground when claimed by sci-
ence and scientists, even when they merely talk of being inspired. Charles Darwin fully 
recognized this when in 184 5 he set himself the rule, "Never use the words higher or 
lower'" Darwin himself disregarded this rule more often than not." At any rate, the rule 
meant that even though a monkey should seem to occupy a ground much higher on the 
evolutionary scale than a mouse, let alone a mollusc, no biologist should call one higher 
and the other lower for a simple reason: Such a grading is a kind of value judgment 
which has no place in empirical science. 
Even more applicable should seem the same rule in the field of exact physical science, 
of which astronomy is a principal branch. Unlike biology, or life science, that deals with 
flesh and blood organisms, of which one is patently more complex and powerful than 
another, astronomy, like physics, is a systematic leveler. It only deals with lifeless entities, 
and is interested only in the quantitative properties of their motions. There is nothing 
higher or lower there, only bigger and smaller, longer and shorter, farther or nearer, but 
never anything that in purely astronomical terms could be seen evocative of "nearer to 
you, oh God," or even of nearer to you, oh man. 
Such is at least the case as long as we define physical or astronomical science as was 
done above. On more than one occasion I have felt it appropriate to define physical sci-
ence as the quantitative study of the quantitative aspects of things in motion. The reason 
for this was my resolve to save the sciences and the humanities from mutual encroach-
ments and, if I may add, leave whatever inspiration they may offer, in compartments that 
are at least methodologically separate. 
Since I doubt that Leon Lederman shared that resolve of mine, I was all the more 
pleased to find in his book, God Particle, a very similar definition of physical science: 
"Physics is a study of matter and motion. The movement of projectiles, the motion of 
atoms, the whirl of planets and comets must all be described quantitatively. Galileo's 
mathematics, confirmed by experiment, provided the starting point."32 
Lederman's words are a combination of plain truth, of a rank half-truth, and of some 
basic assumptions that cannot be justified by physics, but without which physics (or 
astronomy) hangs in mid-air. The plain truth is that unless physics gives a quantitative 
account of what it deals with, it is not yet physics. The half-truth relates to Galileo's math-
ematics. It was not mathematics but, as Duhem showed already in 1913, a long medieval 
tradition that gave Galileo the idea of that accelerated motion which is the only kind of 
motion, be it the free fall of bodies, that obtains in the real world." Moreover, it was nei-
ther mathematics nor geometry that assured Galileo in the first place that matter and 
motion invariably lend themselves to quantitative considerations. One could, of course, 
delight, as Galileo did, in the marvelous coherence of mathematics and become greatly 
excited on that score. 
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But what assumption justified for him the application of quantities to the physically 
real? Certainly not the quantities themselves, for this would be a begging of the question 
itself, a petitio ptindpii. The justification can be made only on the basis of assuming that the 
human mind can know matter and motion, before saying anything quantitative about 
them The justification would also imply the tacit acknowledgment that the human mind 
can validly talk about the totality of quantitatively coherent physical matter which is the 
universe. At any rate, Galileo found the justification with an eye on the Creator: nothing 
showed so much the excellence of the Creator than that created human mind with its 
ability to know quantities as "objectively" as God himself did." 
Such an inspiration was fraught with great perils. Galileo indeed claimed that quantities 
alone counted, and all secondary qualities (taste, colors etc.) had to be considered purely 
subjective." The uninspiring cultural results are too well known to be detailed here. In 
sum, if Galileo's claim is correct one may just as well write off all humanities and take the 
plague of scientism for a sign of health. Since to that plague not a few great scientists gave, 
at least in recent times, an unwitting help, the most effective antidote against it may be 
best sought in statements made by eminent scientists. 
The most impressive of those statements may be the one by Eddington, partly because 
of its succinct character. The line between the sciences and the humanities does not run, 
Eddington wrote, "between the concrete and the transcendental but between the metrical 
and the non-metrical."" This remark, carried to the four-comers of the scientific and acad-
emic world, did not inspire a climate of thought although it should have. Yet only by 
keeping in mind that boundary is it possible to distinguish two kinds of ingredients in the 
inspiration felt by an astronomer about astronomical phenomena. Some ingredients are 
scientific, such as the mathematical simplicity of the explanation. Some other ingredients, 
which are often far more decisive, have nothing to do with the science of astronomy but 
almost everything to do with the ideology or religion, or perhaps plain counter-religion, of 
the astronomer. 
For unless that distinction is made, there remains no remedy for a cultural disaster in the 
making. It is the flooding of the societal scene with the kind of inspiration of astronomical 
phenomena which is a rank counter-inspiration, in the sense defined above. A notorious 
example is a passage by a prominent humanist who clearly had no confidence in his metier 
which is obviously about the non-metric in human reflections. I mean Carl L. Becker, a lead-
ing American historian of the Enlightenment To make matters more revealing, most readers 
of his The Heavenly City of 18th-century Philosophers have been more shocked by a factual 
truth than by a thorough misinterpretation of some very scientific facts. The factual truth was 
that the gurus of the Enlightenment were led not by reason but by a dream about heaven 
on earth. The misinterpretation of the facts is best given in Becker's own words, spread by 
now through more than thirty printings in twice as many years: 
Edit and interpret the conclusions of modem science as tenderly as we like, it is still 
quite impossible for us to regard man as the child of God for whom the earth was 
created as a temporary habitation. Rather we must regard him as little more than a 
chance deposit on the surface of the world, carelessly thrown up between two ice 
ages by the same forces that rust iron and ripen com, a sentient organism endowed 
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by some happy or unhappy accident with intelligence indeed, but with an intelli-
gence that is conditioned by the very forces which it seeks to understand and to 
control. The ultimate cause of this cosmic process of which man is a part, whether 
God or electricity or a "stress in the ether," we know not. Whatever it may be, if 
indeed it be anything more than a necessary postulate of thought, it appears in its 
effects as neither benevolent nor malevolent, as neither kind or unkind but merely 
as indifferent to us. What is man that the electron should be mindful of him! Man is 
but a foundling in the cosmos, abandoned by the forces that created him. 
Unparented, unassisted and undirected by omniscient or benevolent authority, he 
must fend for himself, and with the aid of his limited intelligence find his way about 
in an indifferent universe. 37 
The entire passage is a valuational misinterpretation of facts, well established by sci-
ence, and a presentation of some assumptions as if they were integral parts of science. 
One needs merely replace the ether with zero-point oscillations in the vacuum, the elec-
tron with Higgs bosons, the ice ages with periodic extinctions of life on earth, and 
Becker's passage would be wholly up-to date as well as wholly misleading with its 
counter-inspirational fallacies. No astronomer or cosmologist of note is known to have 
protested the passage above which countless undergraduates have had to swallow for the 
past sixty years. If prominent humanist admirers of Becker found fault with his book, it 
did not relate to his having fallen victim to a tactic which claimed him as he penned that 
passage. 38 
The tactic still works, although Pascal had already unmasked it three and a half cen-
turies ago. He did so as he described the haplessness of the libertine, that is, of the agnos-
tic or sceptic who, in looking out into the vast depths of the cosmos, was terrified by 
mere distances." Pascal could have also remarked that already the Aristotelian universe 
was vast enough to unsettle those who sought comfort in short distances. Publications of 
prominent recent interpreters of astronomy can at most put a brave face to the terror 
they conjure up as they try to discredit common sense perception with intimations of the 
unimaginable magnitude of millions and billions of light years. They merely trigger mis-
guided bewilderment. 
The result is a feeling of utter dejection about being "lost in the cosmos," to recall the 
title of a much ignored book of Walker Percy. As a sane novelist, unwilling to play to the 
galleries, Percy put his finger to that sensitive spot which can never float into the focus of 
any telescope or microscope. That spot was fully alive in a Mount Wilson astronomer's 
wife who divorced him on the ground of "angelism-bestialism." The source of this strangely 
hybrid trait derived from a travesty of inspiration which the astronomical phenomena 
known as quasars could spark. The astronomer in question, Percy reported, was "so 
absorbed in his work, the search for the quasar with the greatest red-shift, that when he 
ca!lle home to his pleasant subdivision house, he seemed to take his pleasure like a god 
descending from Olympus into the world of mortals, ate heartily, had frequent intercourse 
with his wife, watched TV, read Mickey Spillane, and said not a word to wife or children."'° 
Clearly, in this case (and many others could be quoted) nothing was gained in the way 
of genuine inspiration by stretching the limits of the known universe from a few light 
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years to billions of times that amount. But the root of the loss of true inspiration lies not in 
the observatories. It lies with Christians "in whose eyes the traditional Christian content 
and promise had become 'absurd'." Such is the diagnosis of Hannah Arendt, an agnostic 
Jew. She also notes the laughable character of the excuse that either the atheism of the 
eighteenth century or the materialism of the nineteenth offered serious arguments against 
that content and promise. Those arguments, she notes, were "frequently vulgar and, for 
the most part, easily refutable by traditional theology."" 
Whether Pascal was just as antirational as was Kierkegaard, both of whom Arendt blames 
equally for the introduction of the Cartesian dubito into religious belief, is a minor issue. The 
principal issue is that the Cartesian dubito set up mathematical logic as the only reputable 
form of cogitation. Precisely because of this, there followed a growing distrust in man's direct 
registration of external reality, be it a physical or an historical event. Among the results was a 
disregard for the factual historical origin or birth of science. In place of fucts, myths came to 
be cultivated by historians of science. When Bergson wrote that science, the daughter of 
astronomy, "has come down from heaven to earth along the inclined plane of Galileo,"" he 
failed to realize that he had given an inimitably concise rendering of one such myth. 
The origin of science had indeed much to do with the heaven, though with a distinctly 
Christian one, anchored in unique facts of salvation history. This is why the question of 
the origin of science has been a very upsetting topic for many a historian of science." The 
counter-inspiration which exudes from their accounts of scientific progress has much to 
do with that unease of theirs." But the disregard of the true origin of science meant also a 
disregard for the true source of inspiration that liberated science from its repeated still-
births and provided its only viable birth." Of course, once the basic laws of physical sci-
ence were in place, it could further develop in terms of its purely scientific attainments, 
with no consideration for the inspirational spark of its origin. 
The spark was belief in creation out of nothing and in time. This belief, because of the 
status assigned to Christ. worked within Christianity as a unique antidote against the pan-
theism which caused the stillbirths of science in all great ancient cultures and nipped in 
the bud the prospect of science even in the medieval Muslim context." This is not to sug-
gest that today one needs to be a Christian to do physics or astronomy or cosmology 
worth a Nobel Prize or two. But if the same physicist wants inspiration which is much 
better than Cartesian "angelism" or Darwinist "bestialism," or both fused into one, he or 
she will have to look in the direction specified by Arendt. 
What happened to the attitude toward external reality should be of no less interest as 
far as the inspiration and counter-inspiration of astronomy is concerned. The cogito ergo 
sum, which was Descartes' resolution of the dubito, reached its ultimate unfolding in the 
principle, "I think, therefore the Universe is,"" a half-hearted spoof of the anthropic cos-
mological principle. The principle cannot do harm to the universe, but it is already ruining 
the minds of some professional stargazers and cosmologists. The same should seem to be 
true of quantum cosmology if it suggests that expertise with it enables one to create entire 
universes literally out of nothing.'" Such an inspiration is the kind of hubris that opens 
wide the abyss of sheer counter-inspiration. 
If history is a proof, latter-day astronomers and cosmologists will have no genuine 
inspiration, either for themselves or for the millions who gobble up their non-astronomical 
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wortls of wisdom, unless they take it with an eye on a vety specific God. I mean the God 
whose very first recorded act in Genesis I was to let his breath, his inspiration, float over 
what was to become a universe. This remark may sound like plain sermonizing. If it does, 
I refuse to apologize. To support my refusal I could recall a Copernicus, a Galileo (yes, a 
GalileoD, a Newton for whom belief in the Creator of the astronomical universe was a 
signal source of inspiration to give a better scientific account of the starry sky. Why, one 
may ask with Galileo, was Copernicus so inspired as to be willing to commit a rape of his 
vety eyes?" I hope that such and many similar details of the histoty of astronomy are not 
entirely unknown. At least they can be learned by anyone ready to consult well translated 
classics of its histoty. 
Here, to support my refusal to apologize 1 would put the emphasis on a book which is 
the furthest possible Cty from Christian, let alone from Roman Catholic, sermonizing. I 
mean Sigmund Freud's Civilization and its Discontents. To be sure, Freud still refrained from 
describing the Catholic Church as "the implacable enemy of all freedom of thought" 
which "has resolutely opposed any idea of this world being governed by advance towards 
the recognition of truthl"50 While Freud could not be blamed for having been unaware of 
the Christian sources of belief in progress, he had no excuse for ignoring Bury' s memo-
rable unmasking the secularist idea of progress as a mere begging of the question.51 At any 
rate, in Civilization and its Discontents Freud stated that "only religion can answer the pur-
pose of life."5' Not that he viewed the answer of any religion as satisfactoty. Far from it. 
But, implicitly at least, he ruled out science, even his own science (or rather pseudo-
science), of psychoanalysis, as a source of an answer about purpose. The most science 
could do was to palliate the discontent for some, though hardly for all. 
If around 1930 Freud could be struck by a high-level of discontent in our increasingly sci-
entific civilization, one wonders whether he would not be literally dumbstruck today. As an 
antidote to that grave discontent not a few astronomers, relatively greater in number than 
say thirty years ago, offer science. Carl Sagan is a prime example. He and others hope-per-
haps against hope-that with more science there will be less religion. They all share some-
thing of the delusion, memorably voiced by Herbert Spencer in 1850, that once science-ori-
ented education is universal, equally universal will be the clisappearance of crime." Actually, 
crime is becoming universal, owing in no small part to the misuse of tools provided by sci-
ence and technology. 
Today, we have more science than ever and more scientific education than ever, but 
also a crime rate which is sky-rocketing. Partly because of this we have much more reli-
gion as well. The reason for this is the unquenchable hunger of mankind for a sense of 
purpose that can carry one through crimes, tragedies and abide even beyond that disaster 
which is the grave. No talk, however exquisite in its rhetoric, about cosmic brothethood 
or a biocentric universe proves indeed to be of any personal comfort when, say, a promis-
ing young man puts his shotgun into his mouth and blows his brain to pieces. 54 
Science failed, miserably failed, to still that hunger for purpose. Not that it had ever been 
its task to do so. The task of science has indeed been greatly compromised by ever recurring 
efforts of scientists, especially during the last half a centuty, to force science to give what it 
cannot deliver.55 But if scientists fail to gain a sense of abiding purpose from a source other 
than science, their scientific inspiration may not rise higher than the level of feeling some 
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excitement From there it is but a short step to what I have described as the lowlands of 
counter-inspiration. Would that ever fewer would present it as a higher ground, let alone a 
genuine inspiration. As to those who are truly inspired may they never lose heart to keep 
breathing it far and wide. 
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